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 Introduction of Oil and Gas Development 
This article provides an update concerning oil and gas law developments 
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky from August 01, 2019, through July 31, 
2020, and focuses on major legislative and regulatory enactments, as well 
as developments in Kentucky common law. 
I. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The Kentucky General Assembly's regular session began on January 7, 
2020, and was scheduled to conclude on April 15, 2020. However, due to 
the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, the regular session was suspended 
a week early on April 8, 2020.  The following is a discussion of the notable 
legislation relating to oil and gas law passed during the shortened regular 
session.  
A. House Bill 44  
1. "Key Infrastructure Assets." 
House Bill 44 ("HB 44") amends Kentucky Revised Statute Chapter 168, 
Section 1, by adding to the definition of "key infrastructure assets" any 
critical system used in the production or generation of energy.  
Subsection(1)(a) of Section 1 is a list defining certain "key infrastructure 
assets" in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  HB 44 adds to Section 1, 
Subsection 1(a)(5) that natural gas or petroleum pipelines are types of 
pipelines covered under the definition.
1
   
B. Senate Bill 55 
1. "Blockchain Technology Working Group."  
Senate Bill 55 ("SB 55") adds an entirely new section to Kentucky 
Revised Statute Chapter 42, Section 747, the creation of Blockchain 
Technology Working Group ("Working Group").  Blockchain technology 
allows computer systems to connect over the internet and share or distribute 
data, transactions, contracts, etc.
2
  Working Group is intended to be 
attached to the Commonwealth Office of Technology for administrative 
purposes.  Under SB 55, the Working Group evaluates the feasibility and 
efficacy of using blockchain technology to enhance the security and 
increase protection for that state's critical infrastructure, including the 
electric utility grid, natural gas pipelines, drinking water supply and 
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delivery, wastewater, telecommunications, and emergency services.
3
  The 
Governor of Kentucky signed SB 55 into law on April 24, 2020.  
II. Judicial Developments 
A. EQT Prod. Co. v. Big Sandy Co. 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Big Sandy Co., is a published decision from the Court 
of Appeals of Kentucky.
4
  Accordingly, it is binding in the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky unless overruled by the Kentucky Supreme Court.  On appeal, 
EQT Production Company and EQT Gathering, LLC (collectively, "EQT") 
argued that the circuit court erred as to the following: (1) ruling it must pay 
to relocate pipelines and (2) that it could not recover payments mistakenly 
made to Big Sandy Company, L.P. ("Big Sandy").  In a cross-appeal, Big 
Sandy argued that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the phrase 
"coal workings, extend or projected." 
This case involved contractual rights outlined in two deeds addressing 
coal, oil, and gas on property (56,000 acres) located in Pike County, 
Kentucky.  In 1926, predecessors of Big Sandy conveyed oil and gas 
interests in and to a portion of the lands to R. J. Graf.  They retained rights 
to the coal, all minerals, and surface ownership, with the intent to mine and 
remove the coal and other minerals within the property.  In 1928, Big 
Sandy conveyed the oil and gas to predecessors of EQT with language 
similar to the first deed.  According to the terms of the two deeds, EQT was 
obligated to pay Big Sandy a royalty of 1/8 of oil produced from the 
property and coal left in place around a well.
5
  Moreover, EQT was 
required to interfere as little as reasonably possible with Big Sandy's right 
to remove coal and other minerals and obtain approval for "[t]he location of 
any oil or gas well through coal workings, extended or projected."
6
 
With respect to the issue regarding whether EQT must pay to relocate 
pipelines, the Court of Appeals took a de novo review of the following 
language: 
[EQT] agrees to so use said land to so treat same and to so put 
and use his pipelines, pumps, and buildings upon same as to 
interfere as little as may be reasonably possible with the mining 
and removal of said coal and other minerals, and to cause no 
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unnecessary damage and waste to the remaining estate in the 
lands, the coal, other minerals, surface, fencing, building or 
timber and that whether said buildings, fencing or timber are 
now on said land or may hereafter be placed thereon by the first 
party, its successors or assigns lessees or tenants, and shall pay 
for any damage done while using said land to crops or fences.
7
   
An unambiguous written contract must be strictly enforced according to 
the plain meaning of its express terms and without resort to extrinsic 
evidence.
8
  Even if the contracting parties may have intended a different 
result, a contract cannot be interpreted contrary to the plain meaning of its 
terms.
9
  The circuit court interpreted the language as "if EQT's pipeline 
operations interfered more than as little as reasonably possible, EQT must 
pay to relocate the pipelines."
10
  EQT asserted that the interpretation "gives 
Big Sandy unbridled discretion to decide if and when EQT's pipeline must 
be moved at their expense."
11
 However, the Court found that the circuit 
court's interpretation did not rule that EQT's pipeline needed to be 
relocated, that relocation would occur "only if" pipelines interfered more 
than a little as reasonably possible with Big Sandy's operation (emphasis 
added).  Moreover, the Court noted, the payment of relocation only occurs 
if EQT violates the language. 
As to EQT's second argument, the standard of review on appeal of 
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that (1) there 
was no genuine issue to any material fact and (2) that the moving party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  According to the facts, in 2000, the 
mistaken royalty payments were paid after a change in the payment system.  
EQT stated they had no reason to review the payment system without a 
request from the owner of the royalty, and Big Sandy waited more than four 
years before notifying EQT of the payment mistake.
12
  In its appeal, EQT 
did not dispute that it had all necessary information to discover the 
mistaken payments. EQT's corporate representative testified that all 
information needed to identify the overpayment was at EQT's disposal.
13
  A 
simple review of payment history, the mistake would have been discovered.  
There was no disputed issues of material fact to decide.   
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. at 285. 
 8. Id. (citing Allen v. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 657 (Ky. App. 2007)). 
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Big Sandy argued that the phrase "extended or projected" applied to all 
mineable and merchantable coal, contrary to the circuit court's 
interpretation that such phrase applied only to coal that Big Sandy provided 
intent to mine.
14
  The circuit court found "extended or projected" as an 
unambiguous phrase.  An unambiguous phrase must be interpreted 
according to the plain meaning of its express term.  The "fact that one party 
may have intended different results" is not enough to construct the words 
differently.
15
  The phrase appears twice in the deeds mentioned above.  The 
first limited EQT's ability to drill through air courses of mines that were 
already in place or any coal mine "in operation or temporarily shut down."
16
  
The second use must accord to the same meaning as the first; a different 
meaning would be inconsistent.  Therefore, the second use of the phrase 
would limit EQT to the existing activity of Big Sandy; if Big Sandy wanted 
all mineable and merchantable coal, the phrase would not have been 
included. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals found no error in the circuit court's 
ruling and affirmed its decision.   
B. Crisp v. Blackridge Appalachian Land, LLC.  
Crisp v. Blackridge Appalachian Land, LLC, is an unpublished opinion 
from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
17
  In this case, Thomas Crisp, 
James Larger, Magnum Drilling of Ohio, Inc., and Magnum Drilling, Inc. 
(collectively, "Magnum") appealed a declaratory judgment from the 
Lawrence County Circuit Court, which held that a natural gas lease 
Magnum held had expired.  
In 1980, Sam and Joyce Caudill executed an oil and gas lease to Burchett 
Investment Corporation on property known as the Blackburn Property.  
Magnum purchased the lease in 2000, which property was owned by Anna 
Rae Blackburn ("Ms. Blackburn").  The property contained one gas well 
from which Ms. Blackburn and members of the Blackburn family had rights 
to free gas.  Magnum intended to drill new wells on the property due to the 
one prior well not producing much gas.  However, before drilling any new 
wells, Magnum and Ms. Blackburn had a falling out, and Ms. Blackburn 
ousted Magnum from the Blackburn Property.  Magnum adhered to the 
request and has not entered the property or removed gas from the original 
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well since 2000.  In 2015, Ms. Blackburn executed a new oil and gas lease 
covering the Blackburn Property to Bigstar Energy, L.P., because she 
believed the previous lease had terminated according to its terms, as there 
had been no production from the well since 2000.
18
 
Magnum argued on appeal that there was a sufficient quantity of gas 
produced on the property to keep the lease from termination.  For an oil or 
gas well to be deemed as producing, the well must produce oil or gas in 
paying quantities.
19
  Quantities must be substantial enough to pay the lessor 
a royalty.
20
  Based on the facts, Ms. Blackburn never received a royalty 
payment for the well located on the Blackburn Property.  For over a decade 
Magnum never built, permitted, or drilled any new wells on Blackburn 
Property.  Although Ms. Blackburn ousted Magnum from entering the 
Blackburn Property, Magnum took no action to enter the Blackburn 
Property after the oust.  The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court 
that Magnum's well had produced no gas; therefore, under the terms of the 
lease, the lease had terminated.
21
 
Magnum further argued the circuit court erred in determining whether 
gas was produced in paying quantities.  The determination of whether gas is 
produced in paying quantities is a question of fact.
22
  The court received no 
meter readings or measurements of the amount gas used in the houses on 
the Blackburn Property, just speculative testimony of the possibility of free 
gas being enough to warrant paying quantities.
23
  Magnum failed to show 
the production of gas on the Blackburn Property in over ten years.  
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court of Appeals found no error in 
the circuit court's ruling and affirmed the circuit court's decision.   
 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 1. 
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